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IN THE SUPRErlli COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
VERDEAN ILAS CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
15278 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Respondent submits this supplemental brief on the 
question relating to the Suppression Hearing transcript in 
Point II because the Suppression Hearing transcript became 
available to respondent only after submission of respondent's 
brief (respondent's brief, p.l9). 
Parenthetically, although not included in either 
appellant's or respondent's Statement of Facts, respondent 
notes that after the jury returned a verdict of guilty on 
the first two counts against appellant, and was polled, the 
appellant chose to waive his right to a jury determination 
of the Habitual Criminal charge. The trial court briefly 
questioned appellant about the voluntariness of his waiver 
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and found that he did voluntarily waive the jury for 
purposes of the third count (Tr.200-201). 
POINT II - ADDENDUM 
The United States Supreme Court in Clark v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 77 L.Ed. 993, 53 S.Ct. 465 
(1932), addressed an abuse of juror privilege question. 
The Court decided that a person who became a juror by 
deliberately concealing a bias from the court and 
with intent to thwart the prosecution,waived the 
privilege against disclosure of that juror's conduct 
in the jury room,which normally is privileged. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized privilege 
to that of attorney and client: 
"The privilege [between 
attorney and client] takes flight 
if the relation is abused. A 
client who consults an attorney 
for advice that will serve him 
in the commission of a fraud 
will have no help from the law. 
He must let the truth be told. 
There are early cases apparently 
to the effect that a mere charge 
of illegality, not supported by 
the evidence, will set the 
confidences free (authorities 
omitted) ••• But this conception 
of the privilege is without support 
in later rulings. 'It is obvious 
that it would be absurd to say 
that the privilege could be got 
rid of merely by making a charge 
of fraud' ••. When that evidence 
is supplied, the seal of secrecy 
is broken." Id., 289 u.s. at 15. 
-2-
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At the Suppression Hearing, appellant moved to 
suppress the testimony of Mr. Van Sciver relating to the 
contact appellant had had with him concerning the stolen 
checks. Mr. Van Sciver was called and testified in 
substantially the same manner as he later did at trial 
(Suppression Hearing Tr.4-8). In argument against 
appellant's motion, the prosecution sought to admit the 
transcript of an earlier investigative hearing which was 
convened to determine whether or not Mr. Van Sciver should 
be required to divulge the name of his client. In that 
hearing before a different court, that court held no -
attorney-client relationship existed (Suppression Hearing 
Tr.l8), and ordered Mr. Van Sciver to reveal his client's 
name. Although the court reserved ruling on the admissibility 
of thisearliertranscript for purposes of appellant's 
motion (Suppression Hearing Tr.21), it appears that the 
court did not admit the transcript of the investigative 
hearing as the court denied appellant's motion without 
further reference to the transcript (Suppression Hearing 
Tr.21-22). 
Appellant now claims that because the only 
evidence before the trial court on his motion to suppress 
was Mr. Van Sciver's testimony, the standard of Clark v. 
United States, supra, has not been met. Appellant's 
-3-
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contention overlooks the independent existence of the 
stolen checks themselves. The Clark ruling was 
intended to protect against the haphazard, erroneous, 
and even malicious disclosure of otherwise privileged 
communications. No such danger was presented in this 
case because the stolen checks were prima facie 
evidence giving "colour to the charge." Similarly, 
Rule 26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as dis-
cussed more fully in Respondent's Brief, necessitated 
a similar showing of corroborative evidence; which was 
amply supplied by the existence of the stolen checks. 
Appellant's position is that these checks 
did not indicate an ongoing crime but rather a past 
one. However, when Mr. Van Sciver told appellant that 
this situation sounded like an extortion plot and the 
appellant responded, "Well, it is," Mr. Van Sciver 
was forced to make a decision how he should act. 
With the stolen checks in front of him, together with 
the appellant's instructions for him to call the owners, 
give the owners the checks when they came and then 
receive their money in return, Mr. Van Sciver quite 
properly assessed this as an ongoing crime. The 
-4-
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checks corroborated the appellant's admission of the 
extortion plan. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15278 
VERDEAN !LAS CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with one count of Theft 
By Receiving, a felony of the second degree, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953), as amended~ one count 
of Attempted Theft By Extortion, a felony of the third 
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406 (1953), 
as amended; and with Being An Habitual Criminal, a felony 
in the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-1001 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on the first two counts: 
Theft By Receiving and Attempted Theft By Extortion, before 
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a jury and was found guilty on both counts on May 19, 
1977, in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, presiding. A separate hearing was held 
to determine whether appellant was guilty of Count III on 
June 8, 1977, at which time the trial court found appellant 
guilty of Being An Habitual Criminal. On June 8, 1977, 
the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an indeterminate 
term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years on 
Count I; an indeterminate term of not more than five years 
on Count II; and an indeterminate term of five years to life 
on Count III; all sentences to be served at the Utah State 
Prison and all sentences to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming , 
the judgment of the jury at the trial, the judgment of the 
I 
court on the hearing on Count III, and the sentences imposed ! 
as a result of these judgments. 
STATEl1ENT OF FACTS 
Respondent feels that appellant has adequately 
stated the facts of the case and would make only the 
following corrections and additions: 
1. Mr. Ward believed that all three calls he 
received were made by the same man (Tr.25,29). 
2. Mr. Nelson received the last call at 11:30 
-2-
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p.m., February 28. It was agreed as a result of this call 
that delivery was to be made through an attorney (Tr.36}. 
3. The appellant first talked with Gilbert 
Athay about his transaction, but eventually called Robert 
Van Sciver because he could not contact Mr. Athay and 
because Mr. Athay had run for Attorney General (Trl46}. 
4. When appellant went to Mr. Van Sciver's 
office March 1st, he met Van Sciver in the waiting room 
where Van Sciver had been standing with his associate, 
Randall Gaither. Mr. Gaither was "in and about the area" 
while appellant told Van Sciver to call the person on the 
checks, to expect someone bringing in money, and to give 
the checks in exchange for the money (Tr.53,54}. 
5. Mr. VanSciver testified he knew the appellant 
was alone because he saw appellant's car in the parking lot 
(Tr.62}. 
5. Mr. Van Sciver was telling appellant he did 
not like the setup, that it smelled, and so forth in the 
presence of appellant, and Randall Gaither as they were 
leaving his office (Tr.56,63,64}. 
6. Gerald Kinghorn testified that he could recall 
only one prosecution since the Habitual Criminal Statute 
was enacted (Tr.206}. 
7. The Habitual Criminal Statute was enacted in 
May, 1975 (Tr.206). 
-3-
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9. Mr. Kinghorn testified that the policy of 
the County Attorney was to use the Habitual Criminal Statute 
whenever it could be used (Tr.208). 
10. The Career Criminal Unit uses seven criteria 
to identify and prosecute individuals who qualify for Habitual 
Criminal Status, and he listed most of those criteria (Tr.207)
1 11. David E. Yocom testified that he reviewed rap . 
sheets and investigations, and concluded only two out of 
all those prosecuted under the program could have been chargee/· 
and convicted of being habitual criminals (Tr.214,215,216, 
217). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-8-1001 (1953), AS AMENDED, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND. 
A. THE STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE 
AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEED TO THE 
STATES UNDER THE FOURTEENTH N1ENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE LAWS 
PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 1, SECTION 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
After the appellant was found guilty on the first 
two counts: theft by receiving and attempted theft by 
extortion, the trial court in a separate hearing found him 
-4-
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guilty of being an habitual criminal in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1953), as amended. Being an 
habitual criminal is a status offense, and the habitual 
criminal statute will apply only upon a conviction of the 
criminal offense last charged, Zeimer v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d 
232, 381 P.2d 813 (1963). Section 76-8-1001 reads as follows: 
"Any person who has been twice 
convicted, sentenced, and committed 
for felony offenses at least one of 
which offenses having been at least 
a felony of the second degree or a crime 
which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony 
of the first degree or felony of second 
degree, and was committed to any prison 
may, upon conviction of at least felony 
of the second degree committed in this 
state, other than murder in the first 
or second degree, be determined as a 
habitual criminal and be imprisoned in 
the state prison for from five years to 
life. • • • " 
Appellant claims that the legislature's use of the word 
"may" in the statute gives choice of enforcement which 
discriminates against him in violation of his right to 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the constitution of the United States and 
of his right to uniform operation of laws as provided in 
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. Habitual criminal statutes have been employed as 
an exercise of police power by the states to protect the 
public from persons whose criminal histories reveal criminal 
propensity. State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 268 P.2d 998, 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1002 (1954). A theshold question is whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies 
so as to restrict exercise of the police powers of the 
state. In State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974), 
this Court upheld a statute which made it an offense, 
inter alia, for aliens to possess or control a dangerous 
weapon. In concluding that the statute did not violate 
equal protection, the Court reasoned that the: 
" ••• sale, use and possession 
of firearms are proper subjects of 
regulation by the State. The Fourteenth 
Amendment is not generally applied so as 
to restrict exercise of the police powers 
of the State. The statute under 
consideration was directed toward the 
safeguarding of the public peace and 
security and is thus a proper exercise 
of the ~olice powers." Id. at 814, 815. 
(Emphas1s added.). 
Respondent submits, preliminarily, that like the statute 
upheld in Beorchia, Section 76-8-1001 is directed toward 
the safeguarding of the public peace and security, is a 
proper exercise of police power, and therefore is not subject 
to a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection attack. 
Beyond this threshold issue, Utah's Habitual 
Criminal statute withstands constitutional scrutiny under 
both federal and state guidelines. Generally, courts have 
upheld habitual criminal statutes so long as they are 
applied fairly, not discriminatorily enforced,and not 
selected by unjustifiable standards. In Graham v. West 
Virginia, 224 u.s. 616 (1912), the United States Supreme 
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Court considered a statute alleged to be arbitrarily 
discriminatory. In rejecting the claim, the Court gave 
a limited reading to the Fourteenth Amendment: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment is 
not to be construed as 'introducing 
a factitious equity without regard to 
practical differences that are best 
met by corresponding differences of 
treatment ••• A State may make 
different arrangements for trials 
under different circumstances of even 
the same class of offenses." (See also 
authorit~es cited therein.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
The pre-eminent case of Oyler v. Boles, 368 u.s. 
448 (1962), held that failure to proceed against other 
offenders, all within the purview of 'an habitual criminal 
statute, does not deny equal protection in the absence 
of allegation and proof that enforcement selectivity was 
based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, 
or other arbitrary classification. In Oyler, the petitioner 
provided statistical data indicating that 904 men known to 
be offenders, were not sentenced as required by the statute. 
Additionally, petitioner claimed that during a fifteen year 
period six men sentenced to the same court were subject to 
habitual offender prosecution, yet only he was actually 
sentenced during this period. In denying petitioner relief, 
the Court held the evidence did not amount to a denial of 
equal protection: 
•• the conscious exercise 
of some selectivity in enforcement 
-7-
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is not in itself a federal constitu-
tional violation. Even though the 
statistics in this case might imply 
a policy of selective enforcement, it 
is not stated that the selection was 
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable 
standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification. There-
fore grounds supporting a finding of a 
denial of equal protection were not 
alleged." Id. at 456. 
Although Oyler did not specifically address the facial 
constitutional issue, clearly it permitted enforcment 
selectivity if that selectivity were not based on 
impermissibe grounds. 
Various states, however, have specifically 
addressed the facial issue, generally permitting 
prosecutorial discretion expressed in the statute. In 
State v. Troy, 215 Kan. 369, 524 P.2d 1121 (1974), the 
defendant was sentenced as a second offender of second 
degree burglary under the Kansas habitual criminal 
statute. He challenged its constitutionality on the 
grounds it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the 
prosecuting attorney could dictate or control the sentence 
by introducing or withholding evidence of previous 
convictions. This discretion, he claimed, was an 
impermissible delegation of authority and was used unfairly 
as prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining. The Kansas 
Supreme Court held that the exercise of reasonable 
-8-
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discretion in the application of the law to those of the 
same class does not necessarily make the law unconstitutional 
as depriving one of equal protection. Further, the exercise 
of discretion without a showing of discrimination does not 
deprive one of due process or equal protection in a case 
where an enhanced penalty was imposed. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 
State v. Martin, 190 Neb. 212, 206 N.W.2d 856 (1973), 
rejected an equal protection attack on its habitual criminal 
statute, emphasizing the inherent necessity of discretion. 
Again, in State v. Anderson, 12 Wash.App. 171, 528 
P.2d 1003 (1974), the defendant argued the Washington 
habitual criminal statute provided insufficient safeguards 
and standards for application of the statute and that it 
permitted improper selective enforcement. In rejecting his 
claims, the court noted the defendant failed to make a 
showing that the statute as applied to him was applied 
on an "arbitrary and discriminatory basis so as to deny 
defendant equal protection or due process of law." Id., 
528 P.2d at 1005. The court also ruled that there was no 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. ~-
Accord, Wilwording v. State, 438 S.W.2d 447, 449 
(Mo. 1969). 
In the case at bar, appellant relies exclusively 
on State v. Cory, 204 Ore. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955), in 
support of his contention that the word "may" in Section 
-9-
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76-8-1001 makes the statute constitutionally infirm. 
Admittedly, the Court in Cory struck down this wording 
as giving the prosecution too much discretion. However, 
respondent submits that Cory, a 1955 case, goes against 
the more recent weight of authority. States which 
have h<d·,tu; ·1 crimin;c•l ,_,; i '.es 'uthorizing P"''~'ecutorial 
discretion generally require the one charged thereunder 
to show intentional or purposeful discrimination. 
In the instant case, appellant has neither 
alleged nor proved any intentional or purposeful discrimina· 
tion. Respondent submits the great weight of authority 
approves statutorily authorized prosecutorial discretion 
in the area of habitual criminal statute. Express dis-
cretion is consonant with the practicalities of prosecution: 
because these statutes generally include offenses in other I 
states which would be felonies in the home state necessitatin:l 
prosecutorial leeway in determining the precise nature of 
the offense, the check on prosecutorial misconduct is 
prohibition of discriminatory application based on 
unjustifiable standards. 
B. THE STATUTE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED. 
As discussed, ~, Oyler v. Boles, 368 u.s. 448 
(1962) (and other authorities cited in Point IA), permit 
some selectivity in enforcement of the habitual criminal 
statutes, so long as the selectivity standards are not 
I 
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based on impermissible classifications such as race, religion 
and so on. Accord, State v. Deddens, 112 Ariz. 425, 542 
P.2d 1124 (1975); People v. MacFarland, 540 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 
1975); City of Minneapolis v. Buschette, 240 N.W.2d 500 
(Minn. 1976). Further, courts have heldthatconscious 
selectivity in prosecution is not enough to make application 
unconstitutional without a discriminatory showing. State v. 
Andrews,l65 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1969); Delaney v. Gladden, 397 
F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 u.s. 1040. 
In the case at bar, appellant has failed to show 
any selectivity in applicationofthis statute, let alone any 
impermissible selectivity. In support of his motion to 
dismiss the habitual criminal count, appellant's attorney 
called Gerald Kinghorn, Assistant County Attorney, Salt Lake 
County, who testified that since enactment of Section 76-8-1001 
in May, 1975, to the date of the hearing, June 8, 1977, he could 
recall prosecuting only one person under the statute: the 
appellant (Tr.203-206). He testified the Career Criminal 
Unit uses several criteria to determine qualification under 
the statute (Tr.207), and that the policy of the County Attorney 
is to use the statute "whenever it can be used, whenever you 
have access to all of the evidence that is necessary"(Tr.208). 
Appellant's attorney also called the prosecutor, David E. 
Yocom, Deputy County Attorney and head of the Career Criminal 
Program, a federally assisted program organized to identify, 
investigate, and prosecute individuals who fall within various 
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categories (Tr.212,207). Mr. Yocom testified that during 
the 25 month period the statute had been in effect, two 
individuals had been charged with being an habitual 
criminal: appellant and a William Langley. The charges 
against Mr. Langley were later dropped (Tr.213). He 
further testified that out of the approximately 260 
defendants who had been prosecuted under the program 
(Tr.213), no persons other than appellant and Langley 
could have been charged and successfully convicted under 
the statute (Tr.213,214,215,216). He explained that it 
is sometimes difficult to ascertain what degree of 
felony an out-of-state conviction would be in the State 
of Utah (Tr.216,219). 
Appellant was unable to elicit testimony or any 
other evidence in support of his motion indicating 
discriminatory selectivity based on unjustifiable standards. 
Nor did he allege an unjustifiable standard such as those 
mentioned in Oyler v. Boles, supra. In his brief, appellant 
cites Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 u.s. 356 (1886), in support of 
his argument, but Yick Wo prohibited discriminatory law 
enforcement against Chinese owned and operated laundries 
thereby coming under the invidious classification of race. 
Appellant does not allege or prove he was discriminated 
against because he comes within any such classification. 
-12-
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Other cases relied upon by appellant which 
he claims allow him relief are not directly in point. 
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); 
and United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 
1972), are all First Amendment cases. In United States v. 
Falk, ~' the appellant claimed he had been selected 
for prosecution not for violation of the law but for 
punishment of his participation in a draft counseling 
organization. The trial court had refused an evidentiary 
hearing on his motion. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, emphasizing the possible chilling effect on 
First Amendment rights. 
Appellant also claimed First Amendment infringe-
ment in United States v. Steele, supra. His conviction 
was reversed after the court determined the record did 
not support the government's contention the appellant's 
prosecution was not selective. Although the census official 
testified that to the best of his recollection only 
Steele and his three codefendants had refused to cooperate, 
Steele introduced six other individuals, not prosecuted, who 
had refused to complete the census forms, but had done so 
privately. 
-13-
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Finally, in United States v. Crowthers, supra, 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the 
Pentagon had authorized use of a public concourse for 
religious, recreational and awards assemblies on numerous 
occasions, it could not prosecute participants in an 
unauthorized "Mass for Peace." It also ruled that the 
regulation prohibiting all distribution of leaflets, etc., 
without prior approval of an authorized official was an 
unconstitutional First Amendment infringement, noting 
that the prosecutorial selectivity was plainly grounded 
on governmental disagreement with the ideas expressed by 
the accused. 
Several factors distinguish the present case. 
First, no First Amendment rights are involved. Second, 
the record does not establish that the appellant was 
singled out for arbitrary, intentional, or purposeful 
discrimination. Third, appellant introduced no evidence 
that would justify his claim of intentional or purposeful 
discriminatory prosecution. 
The defendant in State v. Baldondo, 78 N.M. 
175, 441 P.2d 215 (1968), made a very similar argument to 
that advanced by appellant in the instant case. Baldondo 
argued that the prosecutorial policy of non-enforcement 
-14-
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of out-of-state offenders violated his equal protection 
rights. In rejecting this claim, the Court concluded the 
statute applied equally to members of the same class: 
"The fact that the statute 
may not be enforced diligently, does 
not give rise to a right which 
would amount to a denial of equal 
protection. 
The allegation of a 'consistent 
and invariable administrative practice,' 
in no:t enforcing the law with respect 
to habitual offenders uniformly, does 
not bring this case within the purview 
of the equal protection clause of the 
constitution." Id., 441 P.2d at 216, 217. 
See State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493 P.2d 604 (1972), wherein 
this Court held an alleged putative father was not denied 
equal protection of laws when an action against him was 
initiated under a procedure criminal in form, although other 
putative fathers similarly situated were served by less 
severe civil process. 
Respondent submits no showing exists of any 
impermissible application of the habitual criminal statute. 
C.· UTAH'S HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE IS A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY 
THE LEGISLATURE. 
The 1975 Legislature enacted Section 76-8-1001 and 
1002. Section 76-8-1001 authorizes some prosecutorial 
discretion in its enforcement by the inclusion of the 
word "may". Appellant feels this legislative authorization 
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constitutes an impermissible delegation of authority and 
because the habitual criminal statute is an enhancement 
of punishment and not a crime in itself, discretion as 
to its application amounts to executive branch encroach-
ment on a strictly legislative prerogative. In reliance 
thereon, appellant cites State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 
(Utah 1977), in which this Court ruled that "elements 
of a crime and the appropriate punishment therefor are, 
under our Constitutional system, judgments, which must be 
determined exclusively by the legislature." Id. at 690. 
Respondent does not dispute this reading of Gallion, but 
suggests the case here is not within Gallion's purview. 
Gallion struck down in part Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (1953), 
as amended, which authorized the Attorney General, in effect, 
the power to define a crime and to designate the penalty 
therefor. Id. at 685. 
Unlike the statute in Gallion, the habitual 
criminal statutes, Section 76-8-1001 and 1002, define the 
penalty and the procedures for enforcement. Unlike 
Gallion, the prosecution has no power to define the crime 
because the habitual criminal provision is not a criminal 
offense; neither has the prosecution the power to designate 
penalty because Section 76-8-1001 expressly requires 
imprisonment from five years to life in the state prison. 
-16-
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Similar challenges have been made against 
habitual offender statutes with little success. In 
People v. Mock Don Yuen, 67 Cal.App. 597, 227 Pac. 948 
(1924), the Court rejected defendant's claim that the 
statute was unconstitutional or an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power because a second or subsequent 
offense could not be punished as a felony unless the 
indictment or information charged a previous conviction. 
State v. Anderson, 12 Wash.App. 171, 528 P.2d 1003 (1974): 
the defendant's claim of improper delegation of authority 
was struck down. See also State v. Williams, 9 Wash.App. 
622, 513 P.2d 854 (1973). Accord, Wrlwording v. State, 
438 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. 1969): 
" • The fact that a prosecuting 
attorney has total discretion to charge 
under the Act is a legislative 
delegation of duty as a proper admin-
istrative function of that office." 
Although the issue appears to be of first 
impression in Utah, other jurisdictions have considered 
the validity of the legislative delegation in authorizing 
prosecutorial discretion under their habitual criminal 
statutes. The jurisdictions almost unanimously agree in 
upholding the delegation. Sections 76-8-1001 and 1002 do 
not permit unbridled discretion as in the State v. Gallion 
statute. The penalty is clearly fixed under Section 
76-8-1001. It is the trier of fact, not the prosecutor, 
-17-
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who determines whether a person is an habitual criminal 
under the 1975 statute. Respondent submits this habitual 
criminal statute is a constitutionally permissible 
delegation of legislative authority. 
POINT II 
THE IDENTITY OF THE APPELLANT WAS NOT PROPERLY 
WITHIN THE TYPE OF COHMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGED UNDER THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT 
CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
When he realized that appellant was asking him 
to participate in a criminal act, Attorney Robert Van Sciver 
informed appellant he planned to tell the police about the 
checks. Appellant does not dispute the propriety of this 
disclosure. His only complaint concerns Mr. Van Sciver's 
court-ordered disclosure of appellant's identity. 
Communications between attorney and client are 
protected to encourage the client to fully disclose his 
problems and circumstances to his lawyer so that he 
may receive better legal service. This policy is embodied 
in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (2) (1953), as amended, in 
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the 
ABA, and in the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 26: 
"Subject to Rule 37 and except 
as otherwise provided by Paragraph 2 
of this rule communications found by 
the judge to have been between lawyer 
and his client in the course of that 
relationship and in professional 
confidence, are privileged, and a 
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client has a privilege (a) if he is 
the witness to refuse to disclose any 
such communication, and (b) to prevent 
his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c) 
to prevent any other witness from dis-
closing such communication if it came 
to the knowledge of such witness (i) 
in the course of its transmittal between 
the client and the lawyer, or (ii) in 
a manner not reasonably to be anticipated 
by the client, or (iii) as a result of 
a breach of the lawyer-client relationship. 
The privilege may be claimed by the client 
in person or by his lawyer, or if 
incompetent, by his guardian, or if 
deceased, by his personal representative. 
The privilege available to a corporation 
or association terminates upon 
dissolution." 
An exception exists to this rule, which the prosecution 
showed in the case at bar negatived any privilege. Rule 
26(2) reads: 
"Exceptions. Such privileges 
shall not extend (a) to a communication 
if the judge finds that sufficient 
evidence, aside from the communication, 
has been introduced to warrant a finding 
that the legal service was sought or 
obtained in order to enable or aid the 
client to commit or plan to commit a 
crime or a tort •••• " 
The record reveals considerable evidence that 
appellant sought out Mr. Van Sciver to carry his criminal 
scheme to fruition. The physical evidence of the checks 
is the best indication of the criminal character of the 
. . 1 
actl.Vl.ty. 
1 Appellant makes reference to a hearing on his motion to 
suppress. The transcript of that hearing was in the 
possession of appellant at the time this brief was filed. 
Respondent will submit an addendum to its brief which will 
discuss the hearing on the motion to suppress for the 
benefit of the court when the transcript of the hearing 
is available. 
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The communications uttered between appellant 
and Mr. Van Sciver which included the appellant's identity, 
are not privileged for several additional reasons: 
1. Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
defines "client" as: 
" ••• a person or corporation 
or other association that, directly 
or through an authorized representative, 
consults a lawyer· or the lawyer's 
representative for the purpose of 
retaining the lawyer or securing legal 
service or advice from him in his 
professional capac1ty; and includes 
an incompetent whose guardian so consults 
the lawyer or the lawyer's representative 
in behalf of the incompetent. n 
(Emphasis added.) 
Appellant was not a client for purposes of this transaction 
because he did not consult Mr. Van Sciver for the purpose 
of retaining him or securing legal service or advice from 
him in his professional capacity. The appellant did not 
want legal advice in this case; he merely wanted Mr. Van 
Sciver to act as a go-between, an agent, for purposes of 
exchanging the checks for the extortion money. McCormick 
on Evidence, § 88, p. 179, says that the privilege for 
communications hinges upon the client's belief that he is 
consulting a lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer, and on his 
manifested intention to seek professional legal advice. 
Further, if the attorney is acting as an agent, the 
consultation is not privileged nor is the statement 
privileged. Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th 
Cir. 1953); Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 
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1953). Because appellant had employed Mr. VanSciver 
in other, unrelated, civil matters, does not make him a 
client in every situation, nor does it make every 
communication between them privileged. The mere fact 
that the reltionship of attorney and client exists 
between two individuals does not ipso facto make all 
communications between them confidential. Evans v. 
~~ 8 Utah 2d 26, 327 P.2d 260 (1958). 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 26(3) (b), 
defines "communication" as follows: 
" ••• [it] includes advice 
given by the lawyer in7the course 
of representing the client and 
includes disclosures of the client 
to a representative, associate or 
employee of the lawyer incidental 
to the professional relationship." 
In the case at bar Mr. Van Sciver cannot be said to have 
given any advice to the appellant that would not be 
exempted from the privilege under the criminal activity 
exception, with the possible exception of his calling 
the appellant the second time at his job to tell him not 
to try to go through with his plan because the police 
had the checks (Tr.68,69). The disclosures by the appellant 
cannot be said to be "incidental to the professional 
relationship" because there was no professional relationship. 
The attorney was sought only to act as a go-between in an 
extortion plot. 
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3. Appellant also waived any privilege he 
might have had by discussing the matter and appearing 
personally in front of third persons. Rule 37, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, permits the holder of the privilege 
to waive an otherwise privileged communication. In 
the instant case, appellant contacted not only Mr. Van 
Sciver, but also Gilbert Athay (Tr.38). Moreover, when 
the appellant brought the checks to Van Sciver's office, 
Randall Gaither was present for at least some of the 
conversation between Van Sciver and the appellant. Mr. 
Gaither was not appellant's lawyer, and was, for the 
purposes of the communication, a thirq party. If matters 
communicated to the attorney are revealed to third persons, 
the element of confidentiality is destroyed. Eg. Clayton 
v. Canida, 223 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). 
4. This Court has upheld the rule which allows 
a client to prevent the disclosure of information which he 
has given to his attorney in order to secure legal assistanc1 
Nevertheless, this Court has also held that the privilege 
should be strictly construed in accordance with its 
objective. Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 27 
Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (1972). In light of this, 
appellant in the present case should not be able to claim 
privilege as to his identity when he was unable to claim 
privilege as to his conduct. 
-22-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The object of the criminality exception to the 
privilege is to remove the protection from conduct which 
contravenes the promotion of the administration of justice. 
Respondent submits that strict construction in accordance 
with this object requires upholding disclosure of appellant's 
identity. 
5. Finally, appellant cites State v. Olwell, 
64 Wash.2d 828, 394 P.2d 681, 16 A.L.R.3d 1021 (1964); Baird 
v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Ex parte McDonough, 
170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1951); and In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 
214, 168 N.E.2d 660 (1960), as authority for his position that 
Mr. Van Sciver's disclosure of his identity was improper. 
While these cases do in a general way give support for 
broadening the privilege to include the identity of the 
client, the great weight of authority denies the privilege 
in these cases. McCormick on Evidence, § 90, p. 185, and 
authorities cited therein. Whether or not to extend the 
privilege depends on the balance of conflicting policies. 
One of the policies considered is protection of the public 
interest. The court in In re Kaplan, supra, upheld an attorney's 
right to not disclose his client's name where he had previously 
disclosed the subject matter of his client's communication. 
The court noted that the public interest was served by the 
client's exposure of wrongdoing committed by others and 
ruled his name therefore required protection. The client 
in Kaplan had not committed any criminal act but feared 
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reprisal from those whom he had exposed. Applying 
Kaplan's reasoning to the case at bar, the public has 
an interest in exposing the perpetrator of criminal 
conduct. Appellant was not benefitting the public 
interest by attempting to use an attorney as a go-between 
in an extortion plot. He expected to personally profit 
from his scheme. Unlke the communicant in Kaplan, who 
was not personally involved in criminal activity, 
appellant did not serve the public interest through his 
communications; rather, he hoped to serve his own interests. 
The public interest in the case at bar required disclosure 
of appellant's identity. 
The communications of appellant which include 
his identity do not qualify as privileged under any one 
of several rationales. Appellant attempted to hide behind 
the privilege to avoid detection for his criminal activities, 
he abused the relationship with Hr. Van Sciver under the 
cloak of seeking legal advice, and he himself waived any 
possible privilege he might have had by discussing the 
transaction with third parties, individuals with whom 
appellant does not allege any confidential relationship. 
In sum, the identity of the appellant was not properly 
within the type of communications privileged under the 
attorney-client relationship, and therefore the trial court 
corrected denied his motion to suppress. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY CONFESSION WAS LAWFULLY 
INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE. 
After appellant was arrested he was taken to 
the County Attorney's Office and informed of his rights. 
He then voluntarily confessed to his criminal involve-
ment. Appellant contends by extended syllogism that: 
1. Because Mr. Van Sciver improperly disclosed 
his identity, appellant was arrested. 
2. Because his arrest was allegedly unlawful, 
his confession should have been suppressed. 
3. Because his confession was not suppressed, 
his constitutional rights have impliedly been denied him. 
Appellant cites Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
u.s. 471 (1963), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), 
in support of his causal chain. For Wong Sun to apply, 
evidence must be obtained as a result of an arrest. This 
threshold consideration has not been satisfactorily met 
because appellant cannot show the disclosure of his identity 
was improper. The privilege under the attorney-client 
relationship is a privilege. It is not a right. The 
appellant acted inconsistently with one who is entitled 
to the privilege, as discussed, ~' and he lost it. 
Assuming, arguendo, that he did not lose the 
privilege and that his arrest was illegal, whether the 
attorney acted improperly would still be a close question. 
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Brown v. Illinois, supra, requires more than a Hiranda 
warning to attenuate the taint of unconstitutional arrest. 
Under Brown, the Miranda warning is an important factor 
in determining whether the confession was obtained by 
exploitation of an illegal arrest, but temporal proximity 
of the arrest and the confession, presence of intervening 
ci;rcumstances, and "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy 
of the official misconduct," id.at 604, are all relevant. 
Admittedly, in the instant case, not much time lapsed 
between appellant's arrest and his confession and no 
intervening circumstances exist to br~ak the causal chain. 
However, the two factors emphasized by the United States 
Supreme Court as the most signficant: the existence of 
the Miranda warning and the purpose and flagrancy of the 
official misconduct,distinguish the case at bar. 
1. The record reveals appellant was given a 
thorough review of his rights and that he waived his 
rights guaranteed him under Miranda. When he did indicate 
he wished to talk with a lawyer, the questioning abruptly 
ended. See Transcript of Statement, Record: 36-41. The 
appellant does not complain of irregularity as to his 
Miranda rights. 
2. The propriety of Mr. Van Sciver's conduct, 
if resolved in favor of extending appellant's privilege, 
would have to be a borderline decision at best. One 
court has already determined that appellant's identity 
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was not privileged. Under the authority and reasoning 
cited in Point II of this brief, it appears a majority 
of jurisdictions would not extend the privilege to 
include appellant's identity, particularly in view of 
the public interest opposing protection. The case at 
bar clearly does not illustrate misdirected and flagrant 
official misconduct. If it would be found that Mr. 
Van Sciver improperly revealed appellant's identity, 
this determination would reflect reasonable error in 
judgment. Further, the purpose of the official conduct 
would have been to benefit the public interest by 
identifying and apprehending an individual involved in 
criminal conduct. Under ~' therefore, appellant's 
confession would withstand an illegal arrest because the 
two major factors in determining voluntariness would be 
satisfactorily met. 
Respondent submits, therefore, that whether 
Mr. Van Sciver properly or improperly revealed appellant's 
identity, his confession was clearly voluntary under 
Wong Sun and Brown standards. Because appellant's 
confession was voluntary, it was properly admitted into 
evidence. 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing reasons and authority, 
respondent urges this Court to affirm the findings of the 
jury and court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOI'I 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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